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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N.A., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, First Security Bank (herein "First Secur-
ity") seeks a judgment of $831,770 against the defendant 
Zions First National Bank (herein "Zions") allegedly 
caused by the rater-company transfer of certain assets 
by Nuclear Controls and Electronics Corporation (herein 
"Nuclear") being financed by First Security to Summit 
International Corporation (herein "Summit") being fi-
nanced by Zions. 
v Case No. 
14010 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Hon. Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., District Judge, 
granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
motion was supported by four depositions and three affi-
davits. The material facts are without dispute, and de-
fendant's judgment should be affirmed by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 6, 1972, Zions perfected a security in-
terest in the inventory and accounts receivable of Sum-
mit, whose business was the purchase of hand calculators 
manufactured by Nuclear and the nationwide sale of said 
hand calculators (Tr. 16, 21, 23). By March 27, 1973, 
the amount of financing extended by Zions to Summit 
reached the sum of $1,100,000 (Tr. 17). Summit's place 
of business was at 180 West 1950 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the offices of Nuclear were directly across the 
street at 175 WeBt 1950 South. After July 1, 1973, Sum-
mit and Nuclear were both wholly owned subsidiaries 
of Trans-Atlas, a Washington corporation (Tr. 17; Heaton 
Dep. 6). 
On July 31, 1973, First Security perfected a security 
interest in the inventory and accounts receivable of 
Nuclear (Tr. 48, 51-55). On January 1, 1974, Nuclear 
owed First Security the principal amount of $831,770.00, 
as a result of consolidation of prior loans. 
On September 7, 1973, the Board of Directors of 
Trans-Atlas Corporation resolved "that the appropriate 
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officers of the company and of Nuclear Controls and 
Electronics and Summit International are authorized to 
effect an inter-company sale of all aspects of the present 
Nuclear Controls, calculator development and manufac-
ture as well as all employees connected therewith, to 
Summit International. . ." (Page 5 of Minutes attached 
as Exhibit "A" to Saunders' deposition.) This inter-com-
pany transfer of inventory and assets from Nuclear to 
Summit was made on the books of both corporations 
effective as of January 1, 1974 (Tr. 17). Thereafter, the 
three salaried salesmen employed by Summit (Saunders 
Dep. 22) moved across the sitoreet into the building occu-
pied by personnel of Nuclear (Tr. 18). At about May 
28, 1974, book entries had been compiled for both cor-
porations to show that the principal physical inventory 
transferred by Nuclear to Summit as of January 1, 1974, 
consisted of: 
Cash Deposit at First Security $ 1,000.00 
Merchandise inventory (finished 
goods) 199,638.00 
Prepaid expenses 3,713.00 
Raw materials 1,295,182.60 
Work in process 612,363.10 
Fixed assets, plant and machinery .. 88,021.62 
Fixed assets, molds 71,367.25 
At this same date (1/1/74), Summit had accounts 
receivable, none of which had been transferred by Nuclear 
to Summit, in the amount of $2,397,968.09 {Tr. 36). 
During the latter part of January, both banks were 
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informed of the inter-company transfer by Nudear to 
Summit (Heaton Dep. 11). Thereafter, Summit and 
First Security conducted several meetings which resulted 
in First Security, on February 12, 1974, taking a new 
promissory note from Summit for $831,770.00 (Tr. 25) 
and a new Inventory Financing Security Agreement and 
a Security Agreement Covering Revolving Accounts Re-
ceivable (Tr. 26-30). After consultation with Ms cor-
porate officers, Jerry Dearinger, attorney for Summit, 
inserted into these security agreements the following 
language: 
INVENTORY FINANCING 
SECURITY AGREEMENT 
* * * 
All collateral covered hereunder, especially 
cash and noncash proceeds (induding chattel 
paper and accounts receivable) is subordinate to 
and the terms and conditions hereof are limited 
in application by a prior and superior security 
interest in accounts receivable held by Zions 
First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 
5). 
SECURITY AGREEMENT COVERING 
REVOLVING ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
* * * 
All collateral assigned to secured party here-
under and all terms and conditions hereof are 
subordinate to and limited by the security in-
terest in accounts receivable presently held by 
Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(Tr. 4). 
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The financing statement filed by First Security with 
the Secretary of State's office similarly provided that it 
covered: 
All inventory and accounts receivable now owned 
or to be acquired, not presently subject to secur-
ity interest of Zions First National Bank (Tr. 
6). 
First Security did not notify Zions of its action in 
taking the Note and Security Agreements of February 
12, 1974, until August 16, 1974, when counsel for First 
t Security wrote to Zions and stated that First Security 
claimed that it "has a lawful first priority with respect 
to the inventory of Summit as well as inventory and 
accounts of Nuclear, but perhaps has a priority position 
second to Zions as to accounts receivable of Summit" 
(Tr. 31). On September 17, 1974, First Security filed 
an action against Zions claiming first priority in the in-
ventory assets. This complaint was dismissed without 
prejudice on September 19, 1974; then plaintiff filed the 
present complaint on November 13, 1974 (Tr. 19). 
The witness Leonard Geertsen, Controller and Trea-
surer of Summit, stated in his deposition (taken 12/9/74) 
that the turnover of raw materials in the manufacturing 
process into a finished hand calculator and the amounts 
receivable to be collected upon would be somewhere be-
tween four and five times a year (Geertsen Dep. 17). 
Wayne Saunders who had been Vice President of Nuclear 
and later President of Summit testified: "By the time 
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you receive the part, make it, sell it and receive the cash, 
some would have come in within 60 days" (Saunders Dep. 
42). Grant Heaton, Vice President of Trans-Atlas, stated, 
"I think it would be fair to say that none of the items 
that were involved in the transfer are here on the prem-
ises, with the exception of some obsolete and scrap items 
that were scrapped off the production line" (Heaton Dep. 
Tr. 22). 
During the year 1974, Zions enforced the terms of 
its Security Agreement to loan only 80% of the qualified 
accounts receivable and 50% of the inventory (Tr. 21), 
and reduced its indebtedness to $153,986.53 as of 1/13/75 
(Tr. 19). All of the amounts which Zions had collected, 
with one exception, has been from the collection of the 
accounts receivable generated by sales of hand calcula-
tors by Summit (Tr. 93). On January 27 and 28, 1975, 
Zions received $20,500 from a public sale of raw material 
inventory and work in process at the premises of Summit 
to Abatronix Corporation^ the highest bidder at such sale. 
Summit has now closed its doors and is no longer in 
business (Tr. 94). 
ARGUMENT 
The above facts fits into three or four different legal 
theories as to why plaintiff's complaint was correctly dis-
missed, but the salient points to be noted at the outset 
are: 
1. Zions did not commit any wrong-doing against 
the plaintiff; is not in privity of contract with it; is not 
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charged nor is it guilty of any conversion of the assets 
transferred by Nuclear to Summit. 
2. There is no legal precedent, and none cited for 
a complaint of this kind by plaintiff as a secured party 
of Nuclear against defendant as a secured party of Sum-
3. Plaintiff ignored and waived its remedy under 
the Bulk Sales Law to set aside the sale within six months 
after discovery thereof (70A-6-111). 
4. Zions has not been unjustly enriched because 
Summit owned accounts receivable of $2,397,968.00 on 
January 1, 1974, and there is still a balance owing to 
Zions of approximately $155,000. The balance of these 
monies were returned to Summit through the revolving 
accounts receivable agreement, and lost to both banks 
wholly and solely due to the failure of First Security to 
advise Zions of the amount of its indebtedness and posi-
tion taken by it on February 12, 1974. 
POINT I. 
FIRST SECURITY AUTHORIZED AND 
RATIFIED THE SALE BY NUCLEAR TO 
SUMMIT, THEREBY RELEASING I T S 
LIEN OBTAINED AGAINST NUCLEAR. 
The plaintiff's Complaint is based upon the Security 
Agreements taken by it from Summit on February 12, 
1974 (Tr. 1-5) which specifically provided that First 
Security took a junior subordinate lien to the superior 
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security interest in accounts receivable held by Zions. 
(See Transcript, pages 4, 5 and 6.) However, the thrust 
of plaintiff's argument on appeal is that it has a "per-
fected security interest in the transferred assets and in 
all cash and non-cash proceeds arising therefrom" pur-
suant to 70A-9-306(2). This statute and theory of plain-
tiff's claim was not alleged in its Complaint. This switch 
of legal theory from alleging the Summit Security Agree-
ments of 2/12/74 to relying upon the Nuclear Security 
Agreements of 7/30/73 was never allowed by an Amended 
Complaint, and it is important to note that the Com-
plaint filed November 8, 1974, alleged that the Security 
Agreements taken by plaintiff from Summit gave plain-
tiff an attached and perfected security interest in the 
inventory and accounts receivable of Summit. (Paragraph 
7 of Complaint, Tr. 2.) 
The legal right of a secured party to assert its hen 
on the disposition of its collateral is codified in 70A-9-306 
as follows: 
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise 
provides, a security interest continues in collat-
eral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other dis-
position thereof by the debtor unless his action 
was authorized by the secured party in the se-
curity agreement or otherwise, and also contin-
ues in any identifiable proceeds including col-
lections received by the debtor. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The text writers have stated: "Since the Uniform 
Commercial Code does not state the manner in which a 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
secured party may consent to the sale or disposition of 
the collateral by the debtor it would seem that pre-Code 
law in this regard will serve as a guide to results that 
might be reached under the Code. Thus, consent to the 
sale of collateral might be given orally, despite a provision 
in the chattel mortgage or other security agreement pro-
hibiting a sale without the written consent of the chattel 
mortgagee or secured party." (69 Am. Jur. 2d Secured 
Transactions Section 462; See also 14 C. J. S. Chattel 
Mortgages, Section 262.) This doctrine that an authori-
zation to the disposition of the collateral results in loss 
of lien, by the "or otherwise" clause in 9-306(2) is made 
dear by the draftsmen's comment to this section of the 
Code. (Anderson U. C. C. Vol. 4, page 298.) 
In many cases a purchaser or other trans-
feree of collateral will take free of a security in-
terest: in such cases the secured party's only 
right will be to proceeds. The transferee will 
take frei whenever the disposition was author-
ized; the authorization may be contained in the 
security agreement or otherwise givm. 
By requiring Summit to execute a new promissory 
note for $831/770, without advancing any new money to 
it, and taking two new security agreements, First Se-
curity authorized and ratified the sale of the Nuclear 
assets to Summit. The only consideration for this note 
and security agreements was the recognized ownership 
of the transferred assets in Summit, and its concomitant 
obligation to pay for the debt of Nuclear. The allegation 
in plaintiff's Complaint (paragraph 7) that the Security 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
Agreements which Summit executed in favor of plaintiff 
"give plaintiff an attached and perfected security interest 
in the inventory and receivables of Summit" should 
legally bar and estop plaintiff from now arguing -that title 
did not pass from Nuclear to Summit; that it his AN 
ATTACHED AND PERFECTED SECURITY INTER-
EST IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS, to-wit; under 
the Security Agreements which plaintiff obtained from 
Nuclear on July 30, 1973, prior to the transfer. 
In First Finance v. Akathiotis, 110 111. App. 2d 377, 
249 N. E. 2d 663, 6 U. C. C. Reporting Service 946, Pascal 
Equipment Company supplied restaurant fixtures to 
Akathiotis d/b/a Merchants Restaurant. The finance 
company took a security agreement on the fixtures from 
Pascal plus an assignment of its interest in the contract 
payments to be made. The finance company failed to 
notify Akathiotis of its assignment, and he paid Pascal 
in full, who became insolvent. The finance company as-
serted its security interest against the fixtures which had 
been sold and transferred. The Court held: 
The sale to AJrathiotis was not in violation of the 
security interest taken by First Finance since 
the contract of sale existed poor to the security 
interest and at the time the security agreement 
was executed First Finance had knowledge of 
and acquiesced in the sale. This fact is evidenced 
by the plaintiff having taken an assignment of 
the contract of sale on the day prior to execu-
tion of the security agreement and by the financ-
ing statement filed by plaintiff with the Secre-
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tary of State in which specific reference to the 
contract of sale is made: 
* # # 
This acquiescence in the sale by Pascal to 
Akathiotis also constitutes an authorization of 
sale, which under § 9-306(2) of the Code as 
previously quoted, allowed defendant to take 
free of the security interest created by his seller 
in favor of First Finance. 
In Re Vieths, Inc., 9 U. C. C. Rep. 943, is a case 
arising in bankruptcy where the bank's security agree-
ment was with Edwin J. Kuhn doing business under the 
name "Vieths." The bank filed under the name "Kuhn" 
because he had formerly been a sole trader, but later 
Kuhn organized a corporation named Vieths, Inc. to 
which he transferred all of his assets. After the transfer, 
a new note was taken by the bank but no new security 
agreement was executed by the corporation, The trustee 
in bankruptcy prevailed against the bank to the accounts 
receivable, because the bank was fully aware of the for-
mation of the corporation and the transfer of assets, and 
it accepted a new note by Vieths, Inc., the transfenee. 
The bank based its claim to priority on 9-306(2) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, but its lien was lost and did 
not continue in the collateral because the transfer of 
assets was done with its knowledge and ratification. 
Two other cases which involve the sale of cattle cov-
ered by security agreements are United States v. Central 
Livestock Ass'n., Inc., 349 F. Supp 1033, 11 U. C. C. 
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Rep. 1054, and Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 77 N. M. 
554, 425 P. 2d 726, 4 U. C. C. Rep. 137. In the former 
case, the court said: 
In the interpretation of the foregoing stat-
ute (9-306-2), this court adopts the rationale 
of Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 77 N. M. 
554, 425 P. 2d 726 [4 U. C. C. Rep. 137] (1967), 
that under the Uniform Commercial Code, a 
lender which permits its debtor to sell collateral 
from time to time as the debtor chooses, and 
relies upon the debtor to bring in the proceeds 
from the sale, declining to exercise its right to 
require the debtor to obtain written authority, 
acquiesces in and consents to the sale and loses 
its security interest pursuant to the "or other-
wise" provision of § 9-306(2) U. C. C, thus 
precluding any recovery on a conversion theory 
against the purchaser. See also First Finance 
Co. v. Akathiotis, 110 111. App. 2d 377, 249 N. E. 
2d 663 [6 U. C. C. Rep. 946] (1969); Credit 
Plan, Inc. v. Hall, 9 U. C. C. Rep. 514 (1971). 
Other cases where the lien was lost by the secured p*arty's 
authorization of the sale through a course of dealing are 
Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, (Iowa, 1973) 206 
N. W. 2d 96, 12 U. C. C. Rep. 356 and Farmers National 
Bank v. Ceres Land Co. v. Hoch, (Colorado, 1973) 512 
P. 2d 1174; 12 U. C. C. 960. See also the annotation at 
97 A. L. R. 646 entitled Chattel mortgagee's consent to 
sale of mortgaged property as waiver of lien. These cases 
involve the same doctrine, but are prior to the adoption 
of the Uniform Code. 
First Security could have elected to set aside and 
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disaffirm the transfer, or it could ratify it; it could either 
claim under it or against it, but it could not do both; 
and having adopted one course with knowledge of the 
facts, it cannot afterwards pursue the other. See Hen-
dricks v. Stark, 99 Fla. 277, 126 So. 293, citing 21 C, J. 
1209-1210. 
In this case, First Security brought suit on the Sum-
mit Security Agreements in November, eleven months 
after the intercompany transfer of assets. It knowingly 
permitted all of its raw materials to be manufactured 
into calculators and sold by Summit without demanding 
or receiving any of the proceeds from Summit. 
The important matter is that First Security to this 
date has not renounced, released or discharged the new 
note and security agreements taken from Summit. It 
made a considered judgment decision to take a new 
promissory note from Summit, secured by a second lien 
on the inventory and accounts receivable. The only legal 
conclusion is that it authorized and ratified the inter-
company transfer of assets, and its lien against those 
assets perfected against Nuclear does not continue, by 
the express wording of 70A-9-306 (2). 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S NEW SECURITY AGREE-
MENTS DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1974, 
TAKEN FROM SUMMIT SPECIFICALLY 
SUBORDINATED FIRST S E C U R I T Y ' S 
LIEN TO THAT OF ZIONS. 
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First Security's brief now claims that it has a per-
fected security interest in the transferred assets and in 
all cash and non-cash proceeds arising therefrom. There 
were no accounts receivable transferred from Nuclear 
to Summit as of January 1, 1974 (Tr. 37), so this claim 
pertains only to raw materials, inventory and work in 
process. The new Inventory Financing Security Agree-
ment executed by Summit in favor of First Security on 
February 12, 1974, covers: 
Raw materials, parts and work in process 
involved in assembly of electronic calculators as 
well as the finished goods inventory of calcula-
tors held for sale to customers. 
*A11 collaterial covered hereunder, especially 
cash and non-cash proceeds (including chattel 
paper and accounts receivable) is subordinate to 
and the terms and conditions hereof are limited 
in apphcation by a prior and superior security 
interest in accounts receivable held by Zions First 
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Empha-
sis added.) (Tr. 5.) 
This language states in the most plain, unambiguous 
manner that when the raw materials including those 
transferred to Summit by Nuclear are manufactured into 
electronic calculators, that the cash and non-cash pro-
ceeds are not security for First Security, but are to be 
first paid and applied to the prior and superior security 
interest in accounts receivable held by Zions. Not only 
did First Security authorize and ratify the sale from 
Nuclear to Summit, by taking the new note and security 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
agreements, but it specifically contracted to take a junior 
and subordinate Ken to that of Zions, The conclusion 
is inescapable that First Security was content to take 
a second hen on the inventory until it appeared that 
Summit was failing in business and could not pay the 
prior lien of Zions, No claim is made that First Security 
was defrauded or that it has a legal reason to now be 
relieved of its contract which specifically states that 
when the inventory was converted into cash proceeds, the 
same belonged to Zions, First Security filed its Com-
plaint based on the Summit security agreements. Plain-
tiff's brief argues that the filing of the Summit financing 
statement "was done for the purpose of giving the public 
additional notice of First Security's security interest in 
the transferred assets," (Page 10 of Appellant's Brief.) 
This gave constructive notice to Zions that First Security 
had ratified and authorized the sale. Wayne Saunders 
was President of Summit at ihe time he signed the new 
note for $831,770 and the new Security Agreements taken 
by First Security on 2/12/74. (Saunders Dep. 3.) He 
testified on deposition: 
A: The simple fact is I read this document 
and when I signed it I signed it with the under-
standing and knowledge that Zions First Na-
tional Bank had first right to all inventories, 
collateral and accounts receivable, and that First 
Security Bank was in a subordinated position. 
That was my understanding of what I signed. 
Q: Do you know who you had conversa-
tions with that led you to that understanding? 
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A: No. I did not have conversations that 
led me to that understanding. I did not discuss 
that with anyone at the Bank. I arrived at 
that conclusion based on what I read. That was 
my interpretation of what I read. (Saunders 
Dap. 27.) 
Neither the cross examination of Mr. Saunders, nor 
the affidavit filed by plaintiff contradicts this testimony. 
We repeat that the First Security Inventory Financing 
Security Agreement said that, "All collateral covered 
hereunder, especially cash and noncash proceeds (includ-
ing chattel paper and accounts receivable) is subordinate 
to and the terms and conditions hereof are limited in 
application by a prior and superior security interest in 
accounts receivable held by Zions First National Bank, 
Salt Lake City, Utah." 
This language covers the inventory which was trans-
ferred; i.e., the "transferred assets" as argued in Appel-
lant's Brief. It does not limit itself to the legal conclu-
sion that Zions was first because Zions had a prior se-
cured position in the inventory. It says that when the 
transferred assets became converted into cash proceeds, 
these monies were security for a prior and superior se-
curity interest in accounts receivable held by Zions. The 
bench and bar should be able to reach the same conclu-
sion as to the interpretation of this language as easily 
as Wayne Saunders, the President of Summit. 
POINT III. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW FIRST SECURITY 
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IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THAT IT HAS 
PRIORITY OVER ZIONS. 
The fact is undisputed that Summit had accounts 
receivable of $2,397,968 on January 31, 1974. None of 
these receivables were transferred by Nuclear to Summit 
(Tr. 37). Zions managed to reduce its debt from $1,100,-
000 as of January 1, 1974, to approximately $155,000 to 
date. Transcript page 24 shows on the back of Zions' 
note that the first reduction of $100,000 on the $1,100,000 
note was not achieved until June 19, 1974, and by De-
cember 3, 1974, the indebtedness was still $596,998.03. 
From January 31 to August 31, the accounts receivable 
shrank from $2,397,968 to $954,084 (Tr. 37) (the differ-
ence is $1,452,884), and only $100,000 was paid and ap-
plied on the indebtedness of Zions. Zions was not noti-
fied of the claim to a first priority by First Security un-
til August 16, 1974. Noall Bennett, Vice President of 
Zions, stated in his affidavit that, "At the time of said 
transfer (as of 1/1/74), Nuclear owed First Slecurity 
Bank the sum of $831,770 as a result of consolidation of 
prior loans, but I didn't know it at that time" (Tr. 18). 
"First Security Bank did not notify Zions of its action 
in taking a Note (Exhibit "D") and the above Security 
Agreements (Exhibits "E" and "F") from Summit until 
after August 15, 1974, When Zions received a copy of 
letter from attorney Don B. Allen representing First Se-
curity Bank." (Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit, Tr. 19.) 
If First Security thinks that the fact is material to 
this lawsuit that Zions had prior notice or knowledge of 
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the claim now made by plaintiff, it should have presented 
such fact to the trial court. Furthermore, affidavits oppos-
ing a Motion for Summary Judgment are required by 
Rule 56(e), U. R. C. P. to be made on personal knowl-
edge. The rule states: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence,, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is compe-
tent to testify in the matters stated therein. 
The affidavit filed in opposition to defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment states: 
Zions had prior notice, or was infoirmed very 
soon thereafter, of the said transfer of inventory 
and other assets from Nuclear to Summit. (Para-
graph 9, Tr. 48.) 
* * * 
In February, 1974, FSB (First Security) 
was assured by officers of Nuclear and Summit 
that FSB had first priority position on inventory 
and assets transferred by Nuclear to Summit, 
and that Zions understood this to be the case. 
(Paragraph 13, Tr. 49.) 
In addition to statements by officers of 
Nuclear and Summit as above mentioned, your 
affiant has other reasonable basis for believing 
that shortly after the said transfer, Zions was 
specifically advised of FSB's security interest in 
said inventory. Zions had notice and knowledge 
of FSB's claimed first priority position in that 
inventory transferred from Nuclear to Summit 
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well before Don B. Allen's letter of August 16, 
1974, referred to in the Affidavit of Noail J. 
Bennett. (Paragraph 14, Tr. 49.) 
Zions made no effort to refute FSB's claim 
of first priority on the inventory and other 
assets transferred from Nuclear to Summit un-
til several months after Zions became aware of 
said claim. (Paragraph 15, Tr. 50.) 
These hearsay statements based on undisclosed con-
versations with unnamed officers have no probative value 
and should be disregarded. Jefferson Construction Co. 
v. U. S., 283 F. 2d 265; Dressier v. M. V. Sandpiper, 331 
F. 2d 130; Sprague v. Vogt, 150 F. 2d 795; Banco de 
Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, N. Y., 114 F. 2d 438. 
It is readily apparent that the above vague statements 
were not made on personal knowledge, to which affiant 
is competent to testify. There was no one other than 
First Security who could tell Zions that the Security 
Agreements taken on February 12, 1974, did not mean 
what they said, to-wit: that all cash proceeds from the 
inventory were limited in application by a prior and 
superior security interest in accounts receivable held by 
Zions. There is a complete omission of any communica-
tion by First Security to Zions prior to August 16, 1974, 
the date attorney Don Allen wrote his letter (Tr. 31). 
The record stands uncontradicted that there was no prior 
notification of First Security's action to Zions; that it 
had taken a new note, and new security agreements,, 
which said that First Security's lien was subordinate to 
a prior security interest of Zions, BUT, nevertheless First 
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Security claimed that it was first. 
This Court should take judicial knowledge of the 
fact that banks do everything possible to collect from a 
debtor whose assets as of January 1, 1974, were in excess 
of Four Million Dollars and by February 10, 1975, had 
closed its doors and gone out of business (Tr. 94). The 
indebtedness to general unsecured creditors is more than 
Two Million Dollars. The failure of First Security to 
notify Zions of the new note of $831,770 and security 
agreements taken by it from Summit permitted a sum 
in excess of One Million Dollars in cash receivables to 
be returned to Summit, which sum was lost in its opera-
tions ($1,452,000 less $100,000 paid June 19, 1974, to 
Zions, less an estimated 20% loss in bad debts). For 
this reason, Zions filed a counterclaim against First Se-
curity that: 
If plaintiff for any reason should prevail 
as to its claim of a first priority in the inventory 
and accounts receivable of Summit, its conduct 
of failure to notify this defendant of its discovery 
of the bulk transfer and reversing its position 
as to the plaintiff being subordinate to the de-
fendant in the collateral of Summit has dam-
aged this defendant by any sums or amounts 
payable on its loan, with interest thereon, which 
this defendant will be unable to collect from 
Summit. (Paragraph 10, Tr. 11.) 
Zions did not rely on First Security's act in taking a sec-
ond and subordinate security agreement, but if it had 
been aware that Summit owed this much secured! debt, 
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which was claimed to be prior to Zions, it could have 
shut down Summit's operations in February, 1974, and 
taken all of its receivables which at that time were $2,-
262, 406. If First Security had given timely notice to 
Zions, both banks could have recovered full payment. 
A principle of law to be applied to this situation is: 
In order to work an estoppel, "silence must be under 
such circumstances that there are both a specific oppor-
tunity and a real apparent duty to speak; or as other-
wise expressed: If a man is silent when he ought to 
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when con-
science requires him to keep silent." (Hendricks v. Stark, 
99 Fla. 277, 126 So. 293, citing 10 R. C. L. 692; 1 Wiltsie 
on Mortgages, 4th Ed. 167, Section 117. 
CONCLUSION 
The parol evidence rule bars plaintiff from testifying 
or daiming at any trial that the new note and security 
agreements which it took from Summit, the transferee, 
did not, as a matter of law, say that plaintiff's inventory 
collateral, "especially cash and noncash proceeds," is 
subordinate to a prior and superior security interest in 
accounts receivable held by Zions. Furthermore, the case 
is governed squarely by First Finance v. Akathiotis and 
In Re Vieths, Inc., supra, which hold that the taking of 
a new note, or security agreements from the transferee 
confirms, ratifies and authorizes the sale and disposition 
of the collateral by Nuclear to Summit, and therefore 
plaintiffs lien in the inventory of Nuclear does not con-
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tinue. 
The decision of this Court would be a significant in-
terpretation of 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, if it rested on the undisputed ratification of trans-
fer argued in Ptoint I of Respondent's Brief. The new 
security agreements show so conclusively as a matter 
of law that the defendant has no liability to the plaintiff, 
that plaintiff-appellant does not discuss their specific 
language whatsoever in its Brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, GREENE 
& NEBEKER 
Richard H. Nebeker 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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